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ISSUES IN THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN SOURCE INCOME
Daniel J. Frisch
Abstract
This paper examines some aspects of the tax treatment of U.S.
multinational corporations. The emphasis is on problems of coordina-
tion of the different tax systems faced by the firms. The U.S. cor-
porate income tax must take account of the fact that the firms' over-
seas income is taxed by the host governments, in a variety of ways.
Currently, the foreign tax credit is the principle mechanism for making
these adjustments; it is examined, along with alternative methods such
as territorial treatment and a deduction for foreign taxes. The paper
also considers the closely related question of coordinating measures of
taxable income. The most common method, the arm's length rule, is
examined. Alternatives to it, including allocation by shares and a
partial case involving allocation of research and development expenses,
are also considered.
First, the revenue effects of these tax regimes are simulated,
with no behavioral responses considered. Responses in location of
investment decisions are then included. The data are taken from the
corporations' U.S. tax returns, cross—tabulated into approximately






(206) 545—1859 or 543—5955This paper is a simulation study of the international aspects
of U.S. corporate taxation. Recently, international operations of
U.S. corporations have accounted for a fifth of total profits and a
quarter of total investments.' Taxes on these activities riay have
important effects on the international and domestic investment decisions
of the firms. For these reasons, analysis of the taxation of U.S.
corporations is incomplete unless international aspects are considered.
Recent attempts to reform the U.S. tax structure have not ig—
nored international aspects. President Carter's 1978 proposals in-
cluded some major changes in this area. Although these suggestions
went the way of most of the other elements in his package, the issues
they raised are likely to reappear in future calls for reform. For
example, President Carter's package called for the ending of "deferral,"
an aspect of U.S. tax law that is discussed below.
In 1977, the I.R.S. issued a set of regulations that made a
potentially important change in the way overseas income is to be de-
fined for tax purposes.2 These "861 regulations", which are also dis-
cussed below, have been the subject of considerable controversy, since
they may affect investment decisions in a number of important ways.
A major goal of this study is to analyze methods of defining foreign
taxable income, especially methods for deciding what part of total
profits are to be taxed as domestic income, and what part as foreign
income. The issues raised by the "861 regulations" are discussed in
this context.2
This study extends previous work in three ways.3 The analysis
of methods for allocating income between domestic and foreign sources
is the first extension. Although a previous work did consider the 861
regulations in isolation, no general treatment of the revenue impact
of these methods seems toexist.4
The second extension involves the level of aggregation of the
analysis. This study uses data which contain information cross—
tabulated by industry of the U.S. firm and by country where the in-
come was earned. The impact of many aspects ofinternational tax law
turn on the precise alignment of U.S. and foreign tax parameters.
Therefore, the availability of data from a number ofcountries is
potentially of great value, since a range of foreign taxsituations
may be included.
Previous studies, in contrast, have had to rely on information
tabulated by the industry of the US. firm, with totals of domestic
and overseas income reported for each industry. Aggregating across
countries in this way may obscure important effects, sincefirms
operating in one set of countries may be affectedin one way by a
tax change, while firms in other countries maybe affected not at all
or in the opposite direction.
The third extension concerns responses that the firms might
make to changes in tax law. Any such change will in generalalter
the structure of investment incentives, and thefirms' investment
decisions can be expected to change. Responses of thiskind may
have sizeable consequences for the firms and forevaluation of tax
policies toward them.3
Section 1 of the paper lays out the issues to be considered.
First, issues involving the current U.S. tax structure, given the
measures of taxable income, are discussed. Then the issues in-
volving definition of domestic and foreign income are described. A
list of nine reform proposals that illustrdte these issues is formu-
lated.
The next section describes the development of INTERSIM, the
tax calculator used in performing the simulations. Data used by
it and techniques used to calibrate it are discussed.
Section III presents the simulations of changes in tax revenues,
given that the firms do not change their behavior. First a baseline
simulation is defined and results for it are displayed. Then the
results of nimulating each of the nine 'ronosals are tresent'd.
Section IV extends the analysis to cover behavioral responses
by the firms. Responses that can and cannot be included are outlined.
Methods to implement those that can be included, and assumptions re-
quired by those that cannot, are discussed.
The next section discusses the effects of each of the reform
proposals on behavior in more detail. It also presents the results
of rerunning the simulations with behavioral responses built in.
There is a brief concluding section.4
I.Issues tobe Considered
A. The Foreign Tax Credit Mechanism
By convention, each country is given the primary right to tax
income earned within its borders. The U.S., like many other countries,
claims the further right to tax the income of its "persons," including
corporations, earned abroad. U.S. law recognizes the primary right of
the host countries through the foreign tax credit mechanism.
The first step in this mechanism is to define the total income
of U.S. corporations, including income earned abroad, and tax it at a
standard rate (now 46 percent). Then, a credit is allowed for foreign
taxes paid, except that if the foreign tax rate is greater, credits
only up to the domestic rate may be claimed. In effect, if the foreign
government taxes at the U.S. rate or higher, then income earned there
is not taxed further at home. But if the foreign government chooses
to tax at less than the standard rate, the U.S. collects a tax equal
to the difference. Of course, this describes a simple foreign tax
credit mechanism; actual practice in the U.S. is subject to several
compromises and difficulties.5
It should be noted that even a pure foreign tax credit mech-
anism may not be the tax structure that maximizes welfare. It would
insure that U.S. firms would not have a tax incentive to invest in
low—tax countries rather than in the U.S., since low tax rates would
be brought up to the U.S. level. In this sense, it would bring the
world closer to "capital export neutrality," defined as the situation
where U.S. owned capital pays the same corporate tax rate no matter5
where employed. The incentive to avoid high—tax countries would still
exist, however, unless an unlimited credit for foreign taxes is
allowed. But then the pernicious incentive would exist for foreign
governments to raise their tax rates on U.S. firms almost without
limit, since the revenue would be at the expense of the U.S. Treasury.
A further point is that "capital export neutrality" may improve world-
wide welfare by removing distortions in the location of capital, but
U.S. welfare may not be improved. Still further, the presence of
other taxes, including the taxes on domestic capital, makes the ques-
tion of taxes on foreign source income a second best one. For these
reasons, welfare evaluation of the tax schemes is beyond the scope of
this study.6
One departure of current U.S. practice from a pre foreign
tax credit mechanism concerns pooling the tax situations of several
countries. A U.S. firm may operate in two other countries, one with
a tax rate less than in the U.S., and one with a tax rate higher. It
would seem that the firm should pay additional tax on income earned
in the low—tax country and not on the other income. The firm should,
in effect, calculate a separate foreign tax credit for each country
and then use the sum. This type of structure is known as a foreign
tax credit with a "per country limitation."
The U.S. structure uses, instead, an "overall limitation" for
most firms.7 A firm with operations in two or more countries adds
its income earned and taxes paid abroad. If total foreign taxes are
less than 46 percent of total foreign income, then the difference is6
owed to the U.S. government. Only 46 percent of foreign income can
be claimed as a credit if total foreign taxes are greater than this
amount.
An example illustrates how the presence of the overall limita-
tion complicates the foreign tax structure. A firm may be operating
in a country with a 40 percent tax rate. The firm would then owe
an additional 6 percent to the U.S. on income earned there, so that
its final rate of tax on this income is 46 percent. Now the firm
opens up an operation of equal size in a country with a 54 percent
tax rate. The overall foreign tax rate is now 47 percent, so that
the firm now owes no tax to the U.S. on any foreign income. The ef-
fective tax rate on income from the first country thus falls from 46
percent to 40 percent, for reasons unrelated to anything happening in
that country. It is clear that incentives are different under the
per—country limitation vs. the overall limitation. For this reason,
imposition of the per—country limitation is one of the reforms
analyzed in this study.
Note that this analysis makes use of the availability of data
by country. Data aggregated up to the industry level already have the
overall limitation built into them, in effect. Therefore, analysis of
the per—country limitation would be impossible with it.
The second departure from a pure foreign tax credit is the issue of
"deferral." Simply put, not all income from foreignoperations is subjected
tothe foreign tax credit mechanism. Profits earned abroadby foreign
subsidiaries of U.S. firms are included only if repatriated to the7
parent as dividends. If retained abroad, they are left out of the
U.S.'s definition of worldwide income until and unless the subsidiary
is dissolved. In 1972, foreign subsidiaries as a whole repatriated
40.9 percent of their income. Since pre—tax profits were $15.356
billion, $9.075 billion were "deferred." U.S. firms earned another
$9.893billion overseas from operations not separately incorporated
("branch" operations) and from receipts of interest, royalties, and
other fees. This income is not affected by deferral in any way. Thus,
repealing deferral would have increased taxable foreign source income
8
of U.S. firms by 56 percent.
It is not clear, of course, how much additional tax revenue would
have been raised. For example, if all countries in the world had tax
rates greater than the U.S. rate, no extra revenue would accrue. It is
therefore worthwhile to include plans that end deferral in the reforms
to be studied.
There are two approaches to ending deferral that should be mentioned.
One would tax the U.S. firms as if their subsidiaries repatriate 100
percent of their profits. The second would treat subsidiaries like branches;
in other words, this method would consolidate foreign subsidiaries for tax
purposes much as domestic subsidiaries are. One difference between them
would arise from foreign subsidiaries with losses. Under the first
method, they would be ignored, since dividends cannot be negative.
Under the second, their losses would be allowed to decrease the
firm's worldwide income. Both methods are considered in this study.
However, data limitations will force the difference between them
to be understated. Subsidiaries with losses cannot be treated
separately if they appear in the same industry—country cell as8
subsidiaries with positive profits. Since some cells do show losses,
however, the two methods for ending deferral do show different
results.
Two more reforms to the basic foreign tax structure are
considered. They are the major alternatives to the foreign tax credit
mechanism. The first is the "territorial" system. Under it, basically no
attempt is made to collect taxes on income from activities abroad.
The tax systems of France and the Netherlands are closest to this
approach.
The second alternative would replace the foreign tax credit with
a deduction for foreign taxes paid. This approach was contained in
the Burke—Hartke Bill, debated by Congress in 1971. Just as a foreign
tax credit is supposed to help attain "capital export neutrality,"
a deduction system is supposed to attain "national neutrality." This
is the situation under which U.S. firms are led to equalize social
rates of return on capital used at home and abroad, where social rates
of return are defined from the U.S. perspective. Let:
r rate of return to capital in the U.S.;
t=taxrate in the U.S.;
r* =rateof return abroad, and
*t =taxrate abroad.
Then social rates of return, defined as income accruing to either
U.S. shareholders or the U.S. government, are equal to r for capital
* *
usedat home, and r (1—t )forcapital used abroad. Private rates
of return are equal to r (l—t) for domestically used capital, and9
* * r(1—t )(1—t) for foreign capital when a deduction system applies.




Thus,r =r(l—t )sothat social rates of return are also equalized.
As Feldstein and Hartman (1977), Horst (1980), and Dutton (1980) show,
this reasoning is far from a satisfactory welfare analysis of the de-
duction system. Still, the claims made for it render it an interest-
ing addition to the list of reforms to be studied.
B. Methods for Allocating Income
It is useful at this point to summarize some of the tax structures
desCribed so far. Total taxes paid by a U.S. firm operating in one
other country are, in general:
TTOTALT + T* (1)
*
Taxespaid to the foreign government, T ,are,in general:
** *
T=t Y (2)
where Y is the foreign country's measure of taxable income from the
* firm'sactivities there, and t is the foreign tax rate. Under a
foreign tax credit mechanism, U.S. taxes are:
Tt(Y + zY*) —c (3)10
where Y is the U.S. government's measure of taxable income of domestic
operations and tisthe corporate tax rate.z is thepayoutratio for
the firm's foreign subsidiary, the ratio of dividends paid over total
after—tax earnings of the subsidiary.9 C is the foreign tax credit.
It equals:
C =Mm[* (4)
It is easy to see how the reforms mentioned so far could be in-
corporated into this structure. For example, ending deferral could
be modelled as setting z to unity (with possibly an adjustment for
subsidiaries with losses). A territorial system would set z to zero.
A deduction system, with deferral left intact, would replace (3) with:
** *
Tt(Y + zY —ztY ) (5)
More countries would have to be added to these simple equations before
the per—country limitation could be modelled.
*
Theremaining questions all concern Y and Y ,themeasures of
taxable income. It is useful first to specify their sum, worldwide
income of the firm, in a simple way:
T0TAL + Y =P(S+ S*) —
DTOTAL
(6)
where P is the world price of the firm's one product, and S andS
*
arequantities sold to customers at home and abroad; P(S +S)thus
equals worldwide sales revenues. DTOTAL are worldwide deductions,and
include cost of materials, payments to factors, depreciation allowances,
and the like. Except for issues concerning exchange rates, defining11
10TALis conceptually nei tlier easier nor harder than defining tax-
able incomefor apurely domestic firm; all the same issues appear.
Forthis reason, problems in defining ToTAL are neglected and a mea-
sure of it is assumed known and constant.
How should be split up between Y and Y? Most governments
haveagreed to use the "arm's length" system.
10The fundamental idea
is to ask how market forces would make the split. This rule asks the
firm to pretend, for taxpurposes, that its domestic and overseas
operations are independent economic entities, operating at arm's
length from each other. Profits of each entity would be naturally
defined as its sales minus deductions.
Intrafirm flows of goods must be measured when defining sales
revenues of each part. Let E (for exports) represent sales of the
home office to foreigners, net of sales of the foreign operation in
the home market. Alternatively, one may assume that each entity car-
ries on all sales to local customers. Then E represents net intra—
firm flows of the product between the U.S. firm and its foreign sub-
sidiary. Since there is a single world price for all transactions,
sales revenue of the domestic part of the firm would be P(S + E),
which equals its revenue from sales to local customers and from
exports. "Net" revenues of the foreign part would be P(S*_E), which
equals its sales to its local customers minus what it had to pay for
imports from the domestic part.
How should total deductions of the firm be split up? Inthe
market,each producer has to pay for the factors it uses. Therefore,
each part of the firm should deduct the cost of factors used for what
is produced locally. Let D be the cost of factors (and related12
*
deductions)used in the U.S., and D be the cost of factors used abroad.
If factors can be used in only one place, then D + D* will equal
DTQTAL. Theincomesof domestic and foreign operations may then he
defined as:
Y =P(S+ E) —D (7)
* * *
y=P(S —E) —D (8)
These two equations represent the simplest form of the arm's length
rule for allocation of incomes. Note that Y + =
TOTAL'as required.
Although the basic conception seems simple, the above description
of the arm's length approach may leave the reader somewhat uneasy.
There are many heroic assumptions and loose ends. What if intra—
firm flows take more complicated forms than exports of a single final
good, with its easily observable world price? What if a factor of
production acts like a "public good" within the firm, so that all
parts of the firm benefit if one part hires it? These problems have
of course occurred to other experts in this field, and the response
11 has been the suggestion of an entirely different approach.
This approach begins byrecognizing that measuring TOTAL directly
*
avoidsmany of the problems with measuring Y and Y using the arm's
length rule. Why not, then, just split up on some sort of rea—
*
sonablebasis to get Y and Y ?If domestic operations seem to account
for 75 percent of the firm's total activities, then Y should be set
to 75 percent of TOTALSimilarly, Y should be set to 25 percent
of TOTAL Of course, a rule must be formulated to decide for what
share each part of the firm accounts. The prime requirement for this13
rule that sets the shares is that it depends on something easy to







whereX and X are attributes of the firm that are easily observable
in both countries.
Domestic and foreign taxable income may be recomputed in this
way in order to simulate the effects of adopting a shares allocation
approach. Note that such a simulation does not necessitate any change
in the foreign tax credit mechanism. Once the new taxable income
measures are defined, the original mechanism, described in eqs. (l)—(4),
may be applied to them.
U.S. states that levy a corporate income tax face the same
problems in taxing national firms as national governments do in taxing
multinational ones. Although the arm's length approach is the rule
among national governments, the shares allocation approach is typically
used by the states. They usually use a weighted average of three
attributes, sales, assets, and employment, to define the shares of
taxable incomes.
The data to be used in this study do not contain information on
employment. Therefore, the following definition of s will be used in
simulation of the shares allocation system:14
s =a(S) + (1-a) (A) (12)
S+S A+A
* *
Sand S are local sales, and A and A are local assets. Proxies
used to measure them are discussed in Section II below. A value of
.5 is used for a in the simulations presented in Sections 111 and V.
It should be noted that z in eqs. (3) and (4), the fraction of
foreign income in U.S. tax base, now has a different interpretation.
This fraction is, implicitly, the ratio of actual intrafirm dividends
to measured foreign taxable income. Up to this point, firms do not
change their behavior when tax laws change; in particular, intrafirm
*
dividendsdo not change. Thus z and Y move in precisely offsetting
directions and the quantity of foreign income in the U.S. tax base,
*
zY,doesnot change. Note that domestic tax base, Y, and foreign
*
taxespaid, T ,dochange.
In sum, there are at least two ways for governments to define
*
Yand Y .Whathappens if different governments adopt different
methods? The country that hosts the subsidiaries of U.S. firms need
*
concernitself only with Y .TheU.S., however, needs to define tax-
able income both at home and abroad. It is possible for the foreign
government's measure of local taxable income and the U.S.'s measure
of income in that country to differ. We need to complicate the basic
specification of taxes as follows:
TTQTAL
T + T* (1)
** *
T=t 'i (2)
T =t(Y+ zY*) -C (3')
C =Mm1zt zt Y15
*
Equations(1) and (2) are repeated for convenience. Y should now be
interpreted as the foreign government's measure of taxable income arising
out of a U.S. firm's activities in its country. Y is defined as the
U.S. government's measure of income from the some activities.
** * Notethat the top line of eq. (4') contains Y .tYequals
the taxes paid by the firm to the foreign government; this is an ob-
servable quantity. Therefore, this actual tax liability is used in
the U.S. foreign tax credit computation. A separate measure of
foreign taxable income is needed in the computation of C only to in-
sure that too much credit is not taken.
Tax treaties between governments usually specify that both
signatories will strive to coordinate their treatment of multinational
13 *"*
firms. In our symbols, it is deemed desirable that Y =Y
However, if one government decides that a shares allocation approach
should be substituted for arm's length, there would certainly be a
long lag before all other governments concurred. Therefore, simulation
* ofboth a "coordinatedt' reform, in which both Y and Y will be
altered, and a "noncoordinated" one, in which only Y will be altered,
will be considered.
Another modification must be made to equations (1) through (4)




T=t(Y+ zY) C (3')16
C=Mm (4")
The only change is the appearance of a new measure of taxable income
abroad, inthe bottom line of the credit computation. It is needed
becausethis measure need not equal Y ,ineq. (3'), the me3sure of
taxable income earned abroad that is subjected to the basic U.S. tax
rate, t.
Yis governed by Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, which
deals with the division of income of related parties. Defining ,
forpurposes of the foreign tax credit, is not seen as a matter of
dividing income of related parties; rather, it is seen as a matter of
defining foreign as opposed to domestic income. This distinction has
meaning in situations that are much more complex than those considered
in this paper. For example, consider a purely domestic firm which
receives income from abroad that is somehow subjected to a foreign
tax. Since there is no related party abroad, there is no Y .Yet
the firm gets to claim a credit for the foreign taxes; therefore, a
Y must be computed. For this reason, a separate part of the Internal
Revenue Code, Sections 861 —864,governs the definition of income used
in the foreign tax credit computation.
In short, there are administrative reasons why Y and Y need
not be identical. As mentioned above, the I.R.S. recently issued a
set of regulations that affect the latter concept and not the former.
It should be stated at the outset that this study is not intended as
an exhaustive analysis of these regulations. They are much too com-
plex to be included fully in the simple model developed here. In17
particular, they list many alternative solutions for each of the
problems they raise. It is not clear that the solutions singled out
here are the ones enforced most frequently; indeed, it is not clear
they are or ever will be the ones enforced. This study is intended
rather as a discussion of the implications of certain principles that
seem to underlie the regulations.
The major reason new regulations were issued in 1977 was the
problem of accounting for factors of production that operate like pub-
lic goods within the firm. Many expenses are typically incurred by
the head office of a multinational firm, yet benefit all parts of it.
Examples cited in the regulation include administrative costs and
research and development expenses. Perhaps a little more hard to see
as a public good is the renting of capital. Yet interest expenses
are also included. This reasoning
is based on the approach that money is fungible and that
interest expense is attributable to all activities and pro-
perty regardless of any specific purposes for incurring an
obligation on which interest is paid.1-4
If these "head office charges" benefit all parts of the firm,
then a fair share should be charged to foreign source income. The
effect is to reduce in the bottom line of eq. (4"), and, if this
line applies, reduce the foreign tax credit and raise U.S. tax liability.
How should be computed, according to the 861 regulations?
Arm's length, since it is the basic principle, should be used for most18
aspects of revenue and costs. Yet for the factors singled outas
head—office charges, an additional allocation must be done. The
regulations suggest, as one alternative, that the shares allocation
approach be used to compute this additional piece.
This option would split D, domestic deductions ineq. (7),
into ordinary deductions,DNHO and head—office deduction, DHO:
D = +
(13)
Income for the purpose of computing the credit limitation is then:
=P(S*-E)-D—(1-s')DHO (14)
s' =a'(—-)+ (1 —a')(A) (15)
S+S A+A
s' and a' are the weights that perform thespecial shares allocation
of DHO.
The baseline for the study is tax law as of 1972, which did
not include these regulations. Therefore, this computationmay be
considered a reform package which may be simulated. Two simulations
are performed. The first sets a' to .5, the same value used fora in
the shares allocation reforms. The second sets a' tozero, so that
only assets are used to perform the allocation of the headoffice
deductions.
To summarize, nine simulations are to be performed.They are:
1) Imposition of the per—country limitation.
2) Repeal deferral, complete payout method.19
3) Repeal deferral, consolidation method.
4) Territorial treatment given all foreign source income.
5) Deduction for foreign taxes paid substituted br foreign
tax credit.
6) Shares allocation substituted for arm's length method, by
all countries.
7) Shares allocation substituted for arm's length method, by
U.S. only.
8) 861 regulations allocation, with a' =.5.
9) 861 regulations allocation, with a' =0.
II. Dataand Techniques
A. Data
The basic source of data is a file of 1972 tax returns of U.S.
multinational companies maintained by the Treasury Department. Speci-
fically, each firm files an "information return" (form 2952) for
each of its "controlled foreign corporations." The Office of Inter-
national Tax Affairs at the Treasury kindly made information from
these forms available to me.
In order to preserve the confidentiality of the tax returns, the
Treasury had to crosstabulate the data before releasing them. Fifteen20
manufacturing industry groups and seventeen countries were chosen;
see Table 1. Cells with information drawn from less than three tax
returns were suppressed, and the amounts placed in the seventeenth
country column ("all other countries"). 246 cells of data resulted.
The variables included in the data set are: subsidiaries'
assets, business receipts (themeasure of sales), earnings and profits,
dividends, payments of interest and royalties to the parents, and
income taxes paid to foreign governments. Taxes are divided into
ordinary corporate income taxes and so—called "withholding taxes"
paid on flows of dividends, interest, and royalties to the parents.
The firms are required to calculate all quantities according to U.S.
tax definitions, except that accelerated depreciation may not be used.
Note that assets are therefore based on historic costs.'5Tables 2, 3,
and 4 present selections of the data. They display foreign subsidiaries'
assets, taxable income, and tax paid to foreign governments, respectively.
Supplementary data are taken from I.R.S., Statistics of Income:
1968—1972, For4n Tax Credit, cpp ons.They provide information
about the domestic activities of the fifteen industries. Also they are
used to calibrate the simulation program. The volume contains data on
various intermediate quantities calculated as part of the foreign tax
credit structure. An example is worldwide taxable income, corresponding
to eq. (3) of the last section. Only industry totals are given.
The simulator can calculate the same concepts from the basic
data and aggregate across countries. When these figures do notagree,
a residual variable is created and spread out over the countries in
proportion to income. In this way, the basic data are not changed,21
but industry totals from the simulator can be brought into confor-
mity with the published nwribers.
An example of the ways in which the numbers can diverge is carry-
overs of foreign tax credits. Firms that operate in liigh—t rix count ries
are allowed to carryover excess foreign t;x credits. These qwntities
are included in the Statistics of Income volume and not in the basic
data.The simulator spreads them out over countries as it does the
residuals, but in proportion to excess credits generated in 1972. Since
excess credits in prior years generated the carryovers, this seems the
most reasonable way.
Headoffice deductions are needed for the simulations involving
the 861 regulations. Data were collected on the two major types,
interest deductions and research and development expenses. The former
are taken from I.R.S., Statistics of Income,_Corporationsj972. The
National Science Foundation's measure of "fundsfor R & D"
is used for the latter; see NSF (1978), Table B—3. Since these
sources include all U.S. firms in the industries, these two variables
are scaled down by the ratio of domestic income of the N.N.C.s to
total domestic income. These ratios are computed from the I.R.S.
volumes.
B. Techniques and Assumptions
The presence of the overall credit limitation creates a problem
in calculating foreign tax credits using aggregated data. Firms
operating in one country may or may not be operating in other countries22
simultaneously. The more countries they operate in, themoreadvan-
tage they can take of the overall limitation. The U.S. would collect
more tax if every firm operated in only one other country than if
every firm operated in every country, for given amounts of income.
Without micro data, there is no way to tell how completely the present
structure of U.S. firms takes advantage of the overall limitation.
Therefore, there is no way to calculate credits after limitation pre-
cisely.
The Statistics of Income book presents the actual level of credits
allowed after limitation in 1972, by industry. The following procedure
allows one to use this information to skirt this problem.
It is assumed that there are only eighteen (types of) firms in
each industry. Seventeen operate in the U.S. and one other country
only; they are called "binational" firms. The last firm in each indus-
try is assumed to operate in every country; it is an "omninational"
firm. The last assumption is that the omninational firm accounts for
a constant proportion of the industry's activities in each country.
This proportion may be called a1 for the first industry, and so forth
through a15.
Given the a1's, the simulator can calculate final credits.
Foreign income taxes are split in two in each industry—country cell;
aj go to the omninational and (1—a1) tothe binational. The limitation
is Immediately calculated for the binatiorial, and its final credit
computed. The sum of credits for all binationals is then computed by
adding over countries. The omninational's credit is computed by first
adding its shares of income and taxes over the countries; then its23
limitation is computed and imposed. The total credits for the in-
dustry are then the sum of the binationaig' credits and the omni—
national 's.
The larger is a1, the larger the total credit will be for the
industry. This is so because the overall credit limitation does more
"good" the closer the industry is to complete omninationality. There
willbe one value of a., foreach industry, that causes credits com-
puted by the calculator to match credits reported in Statistics of
Income. Once they are known, calibration of the simulator is complete.
They may be used whenever limitations need to be calculated.
The a's that satisfy this condition are as follows:
1) Food products: 0.6680
2) Textiles and Apparels: 0.2118
3) Lumber and Paper: 0.4908
4) Printing and Publishing: 0.5000
5) Chemicals: 0.4544
6) Rubber Products: 0.9593
7) Stone, Clay, and Glass: 0.7152
8) Primary Metal Products: 0.1929
9) Fabricated Metal Products: 0.0023
10) Machinery, Except Electrical: 0.2520
11) Electrical Machinery: 0.1291
12) Motor Vehicles: 0.4199
13) Aircraft and Other Transportation
Equipment: 0.898924
14) Scientific Instruments, Etc.: 0.6924
15) Other Manufacturing: 0.7196
Two adjustments were made. First, there never are excess cre-
dits in the fourth industry, printing and publishing. Thus the problem
of how to compute the limitation never arises. All values of
would yield the same answer for this industry; therefore, a value
of 0.5 is arbitrarily chosen. The simulator calculated credits of
$24.17 million; the published number of $24.00 million. These are off
by less than 1 percent. A residual equal to the difference will be
subtracted from credits for the seventeenth country class in all runs.
The other problem concerns industry 9, fabricated metal products.
Even when a9 is set to zero, calculated credits exceed reported cre-
dits. There may be an error in the data or method. Or the aggrega-
tion done to compute the seventeenth country group may not allow a
strict enough limitation to be imposed. With set to 0.0023, com-
puted credits are $61.73 million. Reported credits are $61.29 million;
the computation is off by 0.72 percent. Again, a residual equal to
the difference will be subtracted from the seventeenth country class
in all runs.
III. Simulation Results
With the calculation of the proper a.'s, the calibration stage
is complete. The simulation package, INTERSIM, is therefore able to
analyze the tax issues discussed in Section I.25
In order to facilitate comparisons among thereformproposals,
a baseline proposal is defined first. It simulates the effect of two
minor changes in actual 1972 experience. These changes are also in-
cludedin the simulation of each reform proposal, and the fi tial results
from each are expressed relative to the baseline. The first of these
changesis that carroversof excess foreign tax credits from prior
years are neglected. Without a series of years of data, there would
be no way to simulate how the carryovers would change when the laws
were changed. By dropping them in the baseline, the analysis may
consistently neglect them for the whole analysis. Second, dividends
received from less developed countries were taxed in a special way
until 1976; this "no gross up" provision is taken out in the baseline
and all other simulations.
The data show that total assets of foreign subsidiaries of U.S.
manufacturing firms were equal to $lOO.250 billion in 1972. Total U.S.
corporate income tax paid by these firms was $ll.810 billion. Note
that only taxes paid by U.S. multinational companies are included in
this number; also, it is net of foreign tax credits and investment tax
credits. These firms and their subsidiaries paid $5.087 billion in
taxes to foreign governments. Thus, their total tax liabilities were
$l6.897 billion.
Table 5, line 1 displays the changes causedby the baseline
simulation. U.S. tax revenues increase by $96 million, in 1972 dollars.
Foreign tax revenues are not affected. Thus, except for rounding errors,
the change in total tax liabilities equals the U.S. change. The
possibility that assets of the firm could change is considered in the
section.26
The results of imposing the per country limitations are presented
in line 2. This reform would seem to have little effect.Foreign tax
credits are reduced, and thus U.S. taxes increased, by $70 millionover
the baseline. Again, except for rounding, this change equals the
increase in total tax liabilities, since foreign taxes are unaffected.
The two proposals that eliminate deferral show more of an effect.
The consolidation method causes an increase in U.S. tax revenues of
$344 million over the baseline. For the reasons described above, the
complete payout method causes a slightly larger increase in tax,
$354 million.
Eliminating all U.S. taxation of income earned abroad, the
territorial approach, would reduce U.S. taxes by $815 million, relative
to the baseline. Line 6 shows that substituting a deduction for the
foreign tax credit would raise U.S. tax revenues by $l.366 billion.
Dismantling the foreign tax credit system in favor of a deduction
would be an important change in U.S. tax policy toward international
income.
A coordinated, worldwide, move to a shares allocation approach
would also have major repercussions. The firms' overall tax liabilities
would increase by $544 million. This is the net effect of increasing
U.S. taxes by $2.387 billion and decreasing taxes paid to foreign
governments by $l.842 billion (except for rounding errors). The
current arm's length approach allocates more income to the foreign
subsidiaries than would an approach based on shares of sales and
especially assets. Substantial redistributions of worldwide tax
revenues are implied.27
Countries that show especially large ratios of income to sales
and assets suffer the largest decreases In tax revenues. Since the
INTERSIM package is able to calculate results by industry and
country,it is possible to break down theaggregatechange Inforeign
tax revenue shown in the third column, line 7, of Table 5.Table 6
displays foreign tax liabilities by country, before and after world—
wide adoption of a shares allocation approach.
b Undoubtably,many foreign governments would balk at a move to
a shares allocation system. Line 8 of Table 5 presents the results
if only the U.S. used the shares allocation approach in computing
taxable incomes. Foreign tax revenues are preserved. U.S., and
thus total, tax liabilities rise by approximately $2.059 billion.
This rise is smaller than the one for U.S. taxes in the worldwide
reform because higher levels of foreign tax imply higher foreign tax
credits. Still, the rise in U.S. revenues is substantial. Now, however,
instead of foreign governments bearing the cost, the firms do. In fact,
this reform would cause a larger change in total tax liabilities of the
firms than any other reform simulated.
The last two lines present the results of simulating the special
allocation mentioned in the 861 regulations. They imply that foreign
tax credits will decline, since foreign tax base used in computing the
credit limitation must be reduced. When sales and assets are used in
the required allocation, credits decline, and total taxes rise, by $888
million. Using assets alone causes a slightly larger allocation of
headoffice deductions; therefore, taxes rise slightly more, by $921
million, approximately.28
To summarize, the largest changes in tax revenues would be pro-
duced by the deduction for foreign taxes paid and by the shares allo-
cation approach. If a shares allocation system is instituted world-
widesimultaneously, it wouldaffect the distribution of tax revenues
morethan the total burden on the firms. The territorial system would
also produce a large change in U.S. and total taxes, in the opposite
direction.Finally, the aspects of the 861 regulations that are
simulated produce sizeable changes in tax liabilities.
IV.Behavioral Reponses
The simulation results presented so far assume that the firms'
decisions are fixed. This assumption is unwarranted; the firms may
respond to the tax reform proposals in ways that could affect the
results substantially. This section considers two sets of responses
the firms might make and ways to include them in the simulations.
A. Responses in Financial Decisions
Accounting for changes in intrafirm financial flows can have sub-
stantial impacts on the simulation results. Bergsten, Horst, and
Moran (1978) present a model aimed at dealing with this issue in con-
siderable detail. Partly because their analysis is so complete, this
question is handled in a much more cursory fashion here.
The deferral provision of U.S. law emphasizes the importance
of financial variables. If all firms made full use of deferral, by
having their subsidiaries retain all profits, they could avoid paying
any tax to the U.S. Note that this policy would not place substantial29
limits on the firms' movements of capital. They could use intrafirm
loans and changes in the subsidiaries' equity structure to reallocate
retained funds for investment purposes.
Of course, full use of definal would place some restrictions
on the fir-ms. If all funds are retained abroad, they do not show up
in the parent corporations' incomes. Since dividends paid out by the
parents cannot exceed their profits, it is possible that complete
deferral could restrict payouts by the corporations to their ultimate
shareholders. It seems that in order to understand why the firms do
not use intrafirm flows to minimize taxes, one must answer the question,
why do the U.S. firms pay dividends? The difficulty others have had
in answering this question is the second reason financial responses
16
are given cursory treatment here.
The simplest treatment for intrafirm dividends is to assume that
the subsidiaries keep their payout rates constant. This is done,
with two adjustments. In the simulation of shares allocation with
coordination, dividends are assumed proportional to net income as
measured by the present "arm's length" method. In other words, dividends
do not change just because the way of measuring net income for tax
purposes changes.
The second adjustment concerns measuring payout rates with the
cross—tabulated data. Cells containing subsidiaries with both posi-
tive and negative profits could pose problems. The cells may show
positive dividends, since the firms with losses will not pay dividends
and the others may, but total profits could easily be negative. Spurious
negative payout rates would result. The Treasury computed a special30
tabulation, which excluded firms with losses, in order to solve this
problem. Payout rates are computed from the dividends and profits
reported by this tabulation.
Interest, royalties, and other fees also flow between the
subsidiaries and parents. It is assumed that the ratios of these
variables to gross income are kept constant.
B. Responses in Investment Decisions
The focus of concern with behavioral responses is the firms'
investment decisions. Frisch (1980) presents evidence about the
sensitivity of location of investment to rate of return and tax rates.
Using much the same data as is used here, it relates changes in assets
between 1968 and 1972 to gross and net rates of return. A significant
relationship seems to exist. Specifically, a one percent decrease in
rate of return, accounting for taxes, in one country seems to cause a
decrease in assets there of between .1 and .2 percent over the next
four years.
The partial equilibrium nature of this approach should be stressed.
Some of the tax reform proposals raise effective tax rates, and thus
reduce net rates of return, in almost every situation. The empirical
results in Frisch (1980) imply that these reforms would reduce assets
of U.S. firms in almost every country. Where would this capital go?
Some might be invested by the firms in the U.S., some might be hid
away by local firms in the countries, and some might be consumed in
the long run as investment opportunities are worsened. Of course, all
of these mechanisms would have repercussions, and a complete analysis
would have to include these general equilibrium effects. Unfortunately31
they are beyond the scope of this paper, since they require the
construction of a general equilibrium model of the world economy.
The basic approach, in short, is to assume that firms change
their overseas assets in response to net rates of return, which
changeas tax rates change. The reform proposals thus influence
behavior through theireffects on tax rates on investment. Computa-
tion of these tax rates and the effects that the reforms would have
on them are discussed below and in more detail in the next section.
Applying an elasticity to changes in net rates of return
yields changes in assets. A set of assumptions is needed to translate
these changes into changes in income flows and tax liabilities. The
simplest assumption is that gross income is proportional to assets;
in other words, that gross rates of return are constantThe special
tabulation mentioned above allows one improvement. Presumably, a firm
losing money in a country is not likely to expand assets there in the
expectation that it will lose even more money. Only positive gross
rates of return should be used. Thus, ratios of gross income to
assets are computed from the tabulation which includes only profitable
subsidiaries. Intercept terms are added to account for losses. For
example, consider a small reduction in a tax rate, thus a small in—
crease in net rate of return, and a small increase in assets. If
gross income was positive before, it will increase in proportion;
if negative, it will be a little less so.
Interest, royalties, and other fees are then computed from gross
income as discussed above. Foreign taxable income is then equal to
gross income minus these fees (except in the worldwide shares32
allocation regime). Foreign tax liability equals taxable income
times the effective foreign tax rate. These tax rates are computed
from the special tabulation, in order to avoid spurious negative tax
rates. Dividends are then computed from net income, as described
above. The INTERSIM package is then ready to compute all other
parts of total tax liabilities and display the results as desired.
The remaining issue is the computation of tax rates on invest-
ment. Needed are changes in total tax that would result from changes
in investment, on the margin, under each tax regime. The TNTERSIM
package is able to compute these marginal effective tax rates
directly. It perturbs assets, traces the effects on income flows
and tax liabilities, and computes the resulting changes in total tax.
Likely values of the marginal tax rates under each regime are
discussed in detail below.17
In the first set of results presented below, a value of 0.15
is used for the elasticity of assets with respect to net rate of
return. This value is chosen because it is in the middle of the
range of findings in Frisch (1980). The tentative nature of this
paper suggests, however, that a sensitivity analysis on this para-
meter is appropriate. For example, the paper is able to capture only
four—yearresponses; therefore, the true long—run elasticity may be
larger. For this reason, further results are presented which use
elasticities that rangefrom 0.05 to1.00.33
V. Re s u 1 tsIn cludin Behavioral Resoonses
Table 7 presents simulation results with behavioral responses
included. The elasticity of assets with respect to net rate of return
is set to 0.15. Thetwochanges in thebaselinesimulation cause a
slight decrease in overseas investments. Assets decline by $100 million,
or 0.099 percent, from actual 1972 levels. As a result, foreign income
and taxes decline slightly. The baseline simulation now shows an
increase of only $91 million in the total tax liabilities of the firms.
Imposition of the per—country limitation either raises margihal
tax rates or leaves them unaffected. Consider an omninational firm
that, for simplicity, does not use deferral. Say its foreign taxes
are only 40 percent of its foreign income. Then its effective tax
rate on all foreign income, after the U.S. credit mechanism, becomes
48 percent, the basic U.S. rate in 1972. Now impose the per—country
limitation. The effective tax rate in low—tax countries is still
48 percent. However, the firm might have some operations in a country
with a 50 percent tax rate; the effective tax rate for this country
would go from 48 percent to 50 percent.
The opposite case is an omninational firm with an average foreign
tax rate over 48 percent but with some operations in a low—tax country.
Now the tax rates in high—tax jurisdictions are unaffected, but the
effective tax rate in the low—tax country is raised to the U.S. level.
In short, the "typical" operations of the omninational firms
are unaffected. Tax rates that are on the other side of 48 percent
from the firm's average rate will go up, either to 48 percent or to
the foreign rate, which ever is higher. Income that is deferred or
attributed to the binational firms is unaffected.34
Line 2 of Table 7 illustrates these effects on investment
incentives. Assets decrease slightly, compared to the baseline
results. Detailed results (available from the author) show that some
industries are totally unaffected. Total foreign assets of U.S.
firms decrease by $30 million more than the baseline; this change
causes a small reduction in foreign tax revenues. Imposition of
the per—country limitation, taking behavioral responses into account,
would increase total tax liabilities of the firms by $68 million,
relative to the baseline.
Inferring the direction of movements in marginal tax rates is
easier for this reform plan than for most of the ones to follow.
Per—country limitation is one of only two reforms in which movements
can occur in only one direction. In the others, some marginal tax
rates increase and others decline. The reason is the overall limi-
tation, together with omninational firms whose average tax rate flips
from one side of 48 percent to the other.
Consider the plans that end deferral. If subsidiaries in low—
tax countries retain more than average, ending deferral will lower
averaged foreign tax rates. An omninational firm could find itself
pushed from above 48 percent to below. Effective tax rates on all
its income will go from being equal to local levels to 48 percent, the
U.S. rate. This means that effective rates decline for high—tax
countries and increase for low—tax countries. Another industry might
have its omninational in exactly the opposite position; below 48
percent at first and above 48 percent after deferral is ended. Then
marginal tax rates in the same countries would move in exactly the35
opposite directions. The overall limitation can lead to some exceed-
ingly complex patterns in marginal tax rates and investment incentives.
Althoughanything can happen to marginaltax rates in specific
circumstances, typical trends are clearer. Movements for the binational
firms and for more typical circumstances for the omninationals are
usually unambiguous. For example, ending deferral can only raise
marginal tax rates for the binational firms. If the deferred income
is taxed more than 48 percent abroad then there is no effect; if the
tax rate is lower abroad, the marginal tax rate has to increase.
The first column in lines 3 and 4 of Table 7 show that ending
deferral would cause sizeable reductions in investments abroad. Assets
decline by $l.594 billion relative to the baseline. The plans have
exactly the same effect on investment since they differ only in the
treatment of losses and, by assumption, subsidiaries with losses do
not respond.
These changes in investment decisions are large enough to
affect U.S. as well as foreign tax revenues. Foreign income is
reduced; therefore, repatriations to the parents fall. As a result,
U.S. revenues fall by $30 to $32 million, compared to the simulations
that neglect behavioral responses. In addition, foreign tax revenues
fall by $66 million. The result is that total tax payments by the
firms are only $249 million larger than the baseline for the complete
payout method, and $257 million for the consolidation method.
Territorial treatment reduces marginal tax rates in typical
situations. The credit mechanism, in general, sets the effective tax36
rate on repatriated income to the higher of the local rate or 48
percent. Since the territorial system suspends this mechanism en-
tirely, marginal tax rates in low—tax countries decline. Some marginal
tax rates could still increase. An omninational firm that is low—
tax on averagehas marginal tax rates of 48percent on all nonde—
ferredincome,including income from high—tax countries, if any.
Suspending the credit system causes the marginal taxrates for this
high—taxincome to go up, to the local rate. In this atypIcal case,
to reset marginal tax rates to local levels is to raise them.
Line 5 of Table 7 shows that the typical situations rule.
Territorial treatment lowers investment disincentives, and causes
assets abroad to increase by $800 million. Foreign tax payments
rise by $40 million as a result. Note that the change in U.S. tax
revenues is not affected by inclusion of behavioral responses.
Since basically no attempt is made to tax foreign operations, U.S.
revenues are insulated from changes in the firms' overseas investment
decisions.
Substituting a deduction for the foreign tax credit raises
marginal tax rates in every instance. In the simplest case, the
marginal tax rate under the credit system is the higher of the
foreign tax rate and the U.S. tax rate. Under the deduction regime,
* * MTR=t +(l—t)t (16)
*
As long as t ,theforeign tax rate, is between zero and one,
*
MTR exceeds both t and t, the U.S. rate. Therefore, the marginal
tax rate under the deduction is greater than either of the values37
it could take under the credit. Inclusion of deferral, overall
limitation, and the other aspects of actual law do not change the
conclusion that marginal taxes on investment must increase.
The result is that assets abroad fall by $2.221 billion.
The firms end up paying an additional $l.3l4 billion to the U.S..
and $l.146 billion overall,
The remaining four simulations involve some form of the shares
allocation approach to defining tax bases. This approach can have
some fascinating effects on marginal tax rates and investment incentives.
For example, marginal tax rates on domestic activities can he affected
directly, since domestic assets and income appear in the allocation
formulas. The question of incentives for domestic investment is
beyond the scope of this paper; however, some simple examples are
presented in an appendix.
Marginal tax rates on foreign investment can increase or decrease,
no matter what the credit situation, and can even become negative.
Consider a coordinated shares allocation with only assets used to
define the shares. Further consider, for simplicity, a firm that
does not use deferral and that operates in only the U.S. and one other
country, which has a higher tax rate than the U.S. Equations (1) —
(4)and (9) —(11)would then imply that total taxes paid by the firm
are:
TTOTAL t*(-)TOTAL
+ t(l — TOTAL (17)38
Note that the credit mechanism insures that the tax rate on
*
foreign income is t ,sinceit is higher than t.This equation may
be reexpressed:
TTOTAL ="TOTAL (18)
** —tA+tA t =
(19) A +A
tisthe appropriate weighted average of tax rates applied to total




There are now two channels by which a marginal investment abroad
can affect taxes. First is the usual one; more assets imply more
income to be taxed. Second, assets affect theaverage tax rate be-
cause they affect the weighting scheme. Evaluating the derivative
in the second term,
TTOIAL "T0TAL * A =t + 'T0TAL (t —t) — (21)
BA BA (A+A)2
*
If t is less than t, the second term is negative;increasing assets
abroad reduces taxes because the smaller tax rate becomes more impor-
tant in the average.
Thefirstterm is always positive. It will be small, however,
if gross rate of return in the foreign country is small.Infact,39
if gross rate of return abroad is extremely small and the tax rate
there is low, the whole expression can be negative. Note that baseline
marginal tax rates should be small in such a situation, since not much
income is produced on margin and it is lightly taxed. In sum, it is
possible for low baseline marginal tax rates to be pushed through
zero by the shares allocation schemes.
This occurs in five out of the 246 cells in the data. The cells,
and the marginal tax rates for the baseline and shares allocation
scheme with coordination are:
-Margina1 Tax Rate
Industry Country Baseline Shares
Printing, etc. (4) Venezuela (5) .0008 —.0157
Stone, etc. (7) Spain (11) .0003 —.0122
Fabricated Metals (9) Venezuela (5) .0026 —.0025
Motor Vehicles (12) South Africa .0057 —.0044
(14)
Other (15) Japan (15) .0096 —.0104
In these cases, interactions among tax rates in the various countries
actually result in subsidies to investment.
Such sharp declines in marginal tax rates are not typical for
the shares allocation regimes. On average, in fact, marginal tax
rates rise moderate amounts. Assets and sales are distributed in
the data in a way that shifts income into the relatively high—tax
countries. The net result is to discourage investment abroad by
U.S. firms. As Table 20 shows, assets fall by $852 million under
the coordinated shares allocation regime.40
Total tax liabilities rise by $509 million when behavioral
responses are included. Foreign taxes fall by $l.845 billion and
tax collected by the U.S. rises by $2.353 billion. Again, this
regime implies a particularly large redistribution of tax revenues
away from foreign governments and towards the U.S. (Disaggregated
results, analogous to Table 6, are available from the author.)
Marginal tax rates for the shares allocation scheme without
coordination are more complex. Income is first taxed at the basic
foreign rate, then U.S. law adds aspects that work through the two
channels outlined above. In effect, foreign income is potentially
double—taxed, once by the ordinary foreign rate, and again by the
shares allocation mechanism. To the extent that income is deferred,
this double taxation is avoided.
The effect is to cause greater increases in the marginal tax
rates. In three cases, they rise by enough to force net rate of
return negative. This fact poses a problem for the routine that
calculates behavioral responses. Since a constant elasticity form
is used, a negative net rate of return would call for an infinitely
large reduction in assets. It is clear that the simple functional
form chosen is inadequate for some of the large changes that can
result from this reform. Rather than investigate more realistic,
but more complex, functional forms, this study resets the three
negative net rates of return to 25% of their pre—reform levels.
This procedure insures that behavioral responses in these three
cells are proportionately larger than in any other cell, but not so
large as to skew the whole analysis. The three cells and their41
net rates of return under the baseline, under this reform before
adjustment, and after adjustment are:
Net Rate of Return_____ Ind u strv_________ BaselineNotAdjt edAdjusted
Scientific(14) Brazil (4) .0993 —.2027 .0248
I' Venezuela(5) .1176 —.0079 .0294
BelgIum (6) .1986 —.1390 .0496
Overall, adoption of a shares allocation approach by the U.S.
alone would cause assets abroad to decrease by $4.351 billion; see
line 8 of Table 7. This is largest response in assets of any of the
simulations. This result agrees with the fact that, when behavioral
responses are neglected, this same regime causes the largest change
in taxes. With responses included taxes increase by $l.370 billion.
Inclusion of behavioral responses causes the change in total tax
liabilities to be only two thirds as large as before.
The final two simulations involve the aspects of the 861 regula-
tions. Under these regimes, a share of certain domestic deductions is
allocated to the measure of income used to compute the foreign tax
credit limitation. The result is to reduce credits and raise U.S.
taxes.
Since taxes must increase, it should not be too surprising that
marginal tax rates increase on average. None increase by enough to
cause net rate of return to go negative. On the other hand, it is
probably not surprising by now to discover that some rates go down.
In fact, the third of the five cells listed above again experiences
a negative tax rate, of —.000002.42
How can a marginal tax rate fall so sharply in this regime?
Remember that the tax rate in this cell is very low; therefore, the
foreign tax credit never approaches the limitation. So an allocation
that reduces this limitation does no damage. But headoffice deductions
allocated into this country cannot do damage elsewhere. In shorts
the firms have the incentive to increase operations in this country
so that the special deductions are allocated away from where they
matter into a situation where they do not.
The average effect, however, is to increase disincentives for
investment abroad. Line 9 of Table 7 presents the results when both
assets and sales are used in the 861 allocations. Assets abroad
decline by $l.644 billion. Total taxes increase by $755 million.
Finally, the last line presents the results when only assets are used
as the basis of the allocations. The decline in assets is slightly
larger, $l.650 billion. The change in total taxes is still slightly
higher, $793 million.
In summary, the nine reform proposals can change investment
incentives in complex ways. The result is that overseas investments
of U.S. firms can respond by large amounts. Substituting a deduction
for the foreign tax credit and instituting a shares allocation scheme
without coordination would have the largest effects. Changes in total
tax liabilities are smaller than when behavioral responses are neglected.
It is clear, however, that changes in tax revenues are not the only
importait aspect for evaluating the reforms.
Tables 8, 9, and 10 present the results of the sensitivity analysis
on the basic response elasticity. Perhaps the most interesting changes
show up in Table 10, when the elasticity is set equal to 1.00. Assets43
nowchange by as much as $—23.963 billion; again, the shares allocation
regime instituted by the U.S. only shows the largest response. This
reductionin overseas investment causes large reductions in tax revenues
inthe U.S.and abroad. In fact, these changes are large cnough to
reverse the direction of change intotal tax revenues; total tax pay-
ments nowfall. Note that U.S. revenues still increase, although the
change is smaller than with no or more modest response elasticities.
Similar results hold for the simulations that repeal deferral.
In sum, the effects on investments now appear to swamp, or
nearly swamp, the effects on total tax revenues. One implication is
that the reforms do more to redistribute revenues from the foreign
governments to the U.S., than they do to increase total tax payments.
This implication does not apply, of course, to the territorial
treatment simulation, which reduces U.S. tax revenues. Note that
changes in overseas investments are so large that U.S. revenues are
affected even for this reform. Comparing line 5 of Table 10 to the
same line in Tables 5 or 7 shows that the U.S. collects an extra
$4 million as the result of the response in assets. This increase
comes from the small flows of interest payments, royalties, and other
fees paid by the subsidiaries to the parents. These flows are still
part of the income of the parents arid thus are taxed by the U.S.,
even though the subsidiaries' profits are not taxed by the U.S. under
this regime.44
VI. Conclusions
This paper looks at some aspects of U.S. tax policy toward
multinational corporations. Six basic issues and nine specific re-
forms are formulated. The INTERSIM computer simulation package is
used to estimate the effects of these reforms on investment decisions
and tax liabilities.
It is important to emphasize the limitations of the analysis.
First, it is necessary to work with cross—tabulated data, rather than
with data from individual firms. This fact makes dealing with the
overall credit limitation somewhat difficult. Perhaps simulation
of the per—country limitation, which is closely related, is inaccurate
as a result. Further, the difference between the two plans for end-
ing deferral is probably understated, since some of the subsidiaries
with losses are hidden in the cross—tabulation process.
One could wish for better data, also, on quantities that are not
now involved in the tax calculations but are important to the analysis.
The prime example is assets of foreign subsidiaries. This number is
required on the information returns filed by the corporations; how-
ever, since it does not affect tax liabilities, it is possible that
neither the firms nor the I.R.S. take it very seriously. Biases may
result in the simulations involving shares allocations, since they
depend on assets to set the shares. The simulation of behavioral
responses also relies on assets and may also be faulty. Of course,
it is impossible to measure these biases with the current data.
Similar problems arise in measuring the special deductions
needed for the 861 regulations regimes. Only a proxy could be used,45
since research and development expenses of the U.S. firms are not
separately listed in the data or in published I.R.S. statistics.
As is discussed above, the analysis of behavioral responses by
the firms is certainly not complete. Responses in financial de-
cisions are given only summary treatment. Only partial equilibrium
analysis of responses in investment decisions is attempted.
In sum, this paper extends previous analyses of U.S. taxation
of international income in some ways. It uses data that affords
an improvement since they provide information by industry and by
country. A wider set of issues is examined, particularly inconnection
with allocation of income among national tax jurisdictions. Treat-
ment of responses to tax changes in the investment decision of the
firms is begun. However, it is clear that many extensions need to
be done before analysis of these issues is complete.j1e/4. ,jc/
TABLEI
IUl)USTIY CROW'S AND COUN11 I ES
A.Industry_çps
1.Food and kindred products
2. Textile and apparel products
3.Lumber and paper products
4. Printing and publishing
5.Chemicals anda]lied products
6.Rubber and miscellaneous plastics prducus
7.Stone, clay, and glass products
8. Primary metal industries
9. Fabricated metal products, except nichinery
10. Machinery, except electrical
11. Electrical machinery
12. Motorvehicles and equi)menr
13.Transportation equipment, except motor vehicles
14. Scientific instruments, photographic equipment, wa tclies, and clocks



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Foreign Tax Revenues, By Country
From 1972 With Shares Change
data Allocation
Canada 1,091 737.1 —353.9
Mexico 166.7 127.3 —39.4
Argentina 41.38 38.55 —2.83
Brazil 169.3 68.06 —101.24
Venezuela 69.71 50.86 —18.85
Belgium 178.2 86.87 —91.33
France 359.2 247.5 —111.7
Italy 218.2 142.3 —75.9
Netherlands 178.3 113.8 —64.5
West Germany 719.9 389.9 —333.0
Spain 68.15 44.27 —23.88
Switzerland 114.6 79.77 —34.83
United Kingdom 811.1 409.8 —401.3
South Africa 46.56 36.94 —9.62
Japan 173.2 61.23 —111.97
Australia 252.2 181.7 —70.5
Other 429.5 434.5 +5.0











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Daniel J. Frisch
APPENDIX
MARGINALTAX RATES ON DOMESTIC ACTIVITIES:
TWOEXAMPLES
This appendix points out that international aspects of U.S.
lawmay affect purely domestic activities of U.S. multinational cor-
porations. Specifically, the marginal corporate tax rate on debt—
financial capital is examined. It is well—known that this tax rate is
zero for a completely domestic firm.18 o simple examples are pre-
sented to show that this rate can differ from zero for a multi-
national firm even on its domestic activities.19
Consider a firm with investments as listed in lines 1. through 4.,
column (1), of Table A.l. Total investment in the U.S. is $2000, of
which half is debt financed.Investment abroad, which for simplicity
involves only one foreign country, equals $1000, and is all equity
financed. What happens if the firm undertakes a new investment project
at home, and uses debt to finance it? Column (2) displays the results
after a $1000 project of this type is undertaken (the size is im—
material for the conclusions to follow).
MG1E
Assumethat the return to capital equals 10 percent worldwide.
Also, the worldwide interest rate is set equal to this rate by competition.
Then the extra return to capital (in line 5.) will be offset by the
extra interest expenses (in line 6.). If these expenses are deductible,
taxable income is unchanged (in line 7.). A purely domestic firm
would therefore find its tax liability unchanged. The project would
engender no increase in taxes; thus, debt financed capital would beA2
untaxed at the corporate level. A similar result would hold for a
multinational company facing a pure foreign tax credit mechanism
based on arm's length principles.
Injection of shares allocation principles can alter this result,
however. To see this, consider the simplest form of a shares allo—
cation regime, with complete coordination worldwi(e and uith only one
factor, assets, used in the allocation formula.
The allocation share (in line 8.) changes as the structure of
assets changes. The result is that less income is allocated to the
foreign government (in line 9.) and, implicitly, more to the U.S.
The first effect is that taxes paid to the foreign government (line
10.) fall.
This fall in taxes abroad is partially made up by a rise in taxes
in the U.S. Note that it is assumed, for simplicity, that the firm
does not defer any foreign income. In this example, the foreign tax
rate, 60 percent, exceeds the U.S. rate, 46 percent. Therefore, the
extra taxes at home do not fully offset the drop in taxes abroad.
Lines 11. through 15. show this. Tax paid to the U.S. equals total
income times 46 percent (line 11.) minus foreign income times 46
percent (line 13.), since the credit limitation applies. Since foreign
income is lower, taxes paid to the U.S. (line 15.) increase. However,
line 16. shows that total taxes paid by the firmdecrease.
In sum, total taxes paid by the firm fall by $2.20. Since re-
turn to capital rises by $100, there is an Implied subsidy rate to
capital of 2.2 percent. Although this result is highly sensitive toA3
the assumptions, particularly relative U.S. and foreign tax rates,
it is clear that the marginal tax rate on a purely debt financed,
purely domestic project is not identically zero.
The 861 regulations issued in 1977 mention some aspects of the
shares allocation approach, as is discussed in the paper. Table A.2
presents a simple example of how these aspects can affect the marginal
tax rate on the same type of project. Lines 1. through 7. of this table
i2reintroducethe experiment.
4G1-
Thefirst difference between the tables is in computation of
foreign taxable income, in lines 8. and 9. The arm's length approach
is to be used for the basic allocation of incomes in this tax regime.
Thus foreign gross income and deductions are computed separately, and
foreign taxable income derived from them. Given the competitive assump-
tions made here, and the assumption that no debt is used for foreign
capital, foreign taxable income is simply equal to marginal product
of foreign capital. Since this capital does not change, neither foreign
taxable income (in line 9.) nor tax paid abroad (in line 10.) change.
The only aspect of taxes that is affected by the project is the
foreign tax credit, computed in lines 13. through 17. Specifically,
a speci1 allocation of interest expenses, which are part of head—
office charges, is required. Line 13. displays the allocation share;
as in Table A.l, it declines from 0.33 to 0.25. Interest expenses,
however, increase as a result of the project. Therefore, the required
allocation (in line 14.) rises. Foreign tax base to be used in the
credit limitation (line 15.) falls, and thus the limitation (line 16.)A4
falls. Since the limitation applies in this example, foreign tax
credits (line 17.) fall, and taxes paid to the U.S. (line 18.) rise.
In sum, the project affects total taxes paid, even though neither
domestic nor foreign taxable incomes are affected. As long as the firm
is in a situation where the credit limitation applies, requiring the
allocation of interest deductions will reduce foreign tax credits
and raise total taxes paid. Thus, U.S. multinational corporations in
this situation will face a positive marginal tax rate on purely domes-
tic, purely debt—financed investments. In this example, total tax
rises by $7.80, so that the marginal tax rate on a project of this
type is 7.8 percent.TABLE A.l
EXAMPLE OF SHARES ALLOCATION
(1) (2)
I. Capital Stocks
1. Domestic, equity financed 1000 1000
2. Domestic, debt financed 100() 2000
3. Foreign (equity financed) 1000 11)00
4. Total capital 3000 4000
II.Taxable Income
5. Return to capital, 4. x 0.10 300 400
6. Interest expense, 2. x 0.10 100 200
7. Taxable income, 5. —6. 200 200
III. Taxes Paid
8. Allocation share, 3. 4. 0.33 0.25
9. Foreign taxable income, 7. x 8. 66 50
10. Tax paid to foreign gov., 9. x 0.6039.6 30.0
11. U.S. tax before credit, 7. x 0.46 92 92
12. Potential foreign tax credit, 10. 39.6 30.0
13. Credit limitation, 9. x 0.46 30.4 23.0
14. Foreign tax credit, lesser of 30.4 23.0
12., 13.
15. Tax paid to U.s.,11. —14. 61.6 69.0
16. Total taxes paid, 10. + 15. 101.2 99.0
IV.Marginal Tax Rate on Return to Capital
17. Change in tax, from 16. —2.2
18. Change in return to capital, from 5. 100
19. Marginal tax (subsidy) rate, 16. -17 —2.2%TABLE A.2
EXAMPLE OF ASPECTS OF 861 REGULATIONS
(1) (2)
I. Capital Stocks
1. Domestic, equity financed 1000 1000
2. Domestic, debt financed 1000 2000
3. Foreign (equity financed) 1000 1000
4. Total capital 3000 4000
II. Taxable Income
5. Return to capital, 4. x 0.10 300 400
6. Interest expense, 2. x 0.10 _lO0 200
7. Taxable income, 5. —6. 200 200
III. Taxes Paid
8. Foreign return to equity, 3. x 0.10 100 100
9. Foreign taxable income, 8. 100 100
10. Tax paid to foreign gov., 9. x 0.60 60 60
11. U.S. tax before credit, 7. x 0.46 92 92
12. Potential foreign tax credit, 10. 60 60
13. Allocation share, 3. -4. 0.33 0.25
14. Allocation of "headoffice charges", 33 50
6. x 13.
15. Foreign base for limitation, 9. —14. 67 50
16. Credit limitation, 15. x 0.46 30.8 23.0
17. Foreign tax credit, lesser of 30.8 23.0
• 12., 16.
18. Tax paid to U.S., 11. —17. 61.2 69.0
19.Total taxes paid, 10. +18. 121.2 129.0
IV. Marginal Tax Rate on Return to Capital
20. Change in tax, from 19. 7.8
21. Change in return to capital, from 5. 100
22. Marginal tax rate, 20. -21. 7.8%Daniel J. Frisch
FOOTNOTES
1. Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978),p. vii.
2. Treas. Reg. 1.861—8, T.D. 7456,1977—C,I.R.S. 6.
3. Recent simulation studies of international taxation include
Bergsten, Horst, and Moran (1978), Chapter 6 and Appendix B, and
Hufbauer and Foster (1976).
4. The 861 regulations are examined in Bergsten, Horst, and Moran
(1978), Chapter 6. Musgrave (1973) and Surrey (1978) discuss
more general questions but do not conduct revenue simulations.
5. This description is, of course, highly oversimplified. McDaniel
and Ault (1977) provides an overview of these issues.
6. Feldstein and Hartman (1977), Horst (1980), and Dutton (1980) are
examples of works that consider welfare implications.
7. OIl—related activities must now use the per—country limitation;
note that no oil—related industries are included in the simula-
tions. In 1972, firms could choose the per—country limitation,
but few did so.
8. The numbers are computed from I.R.S., Statistics of Income, 1968—
1977, Controlled Foreign Corporations, p. 93, and I.R.S., Statistics
of Income, 1968—1972, Foreign Tax Credit, p. 77.
9. Note that zY Is greater than actual dividends paid.It equals
actual dividends "grossed up" to reflect pretax profits of the
subsidiaries.In 1972, U.S. firms did not have to "gross up" dividends received
from less developed countries; the formulas are slightly dif-
ferent for this income.
10.McDaniel and Ault (1977), Chap. 8, Nusgrave (1973), Surrey
(1978). As an example, see Treas. Reg. l.482—l(b)(1), T.D. 6952,
1968—7, C.B. 218.
11.Musgrave (1973), Surrey (1978).
12.Musgrave (1973), McLure (1980).
13.McDaniel and Ault (1977), Chapter 8.
14. Treas. Reg. l—861—8(e)(2), T.D. 7456, 1977—6, I.R.B. 6.
15.For more information on this data, see Frisch (1980) and I.R.S.
S tat istic sof Income,1968-1972, Controlled Foreig nCoiporati
Section2, "Explanation of Terms."
16.For examples, see Mervyn King, Public Policy and the Corporation
(Haistead Press, N.Y., 1977), D. Bradford and R. Gordon, "Taxation
and Corporate Finance," Princeton Univ. Financial Research Center
Memo 31 (Jan., 1980), and N. Feldstein and J. Green, "Why Do
Companies Pay Dividends?" NBER Working Paper 413 (December 1979).
17. This process for computing marginal tax rates embodies all of
the assumptions made up to this point. Frisch (1980), containing
the empirical work, makes different assumptions about financial
decisions and therefore uses different measures of the marginal
tax rates. It would be interesting to rerun the empiricalanalysis using marginal tax rates as computed here; before
this could be done, however, INTERSIM would have to be extended
to include 1968 tax law and data.
18. See Stiglitz (1973).
19.For a more formal analysis of similar issues, see Frisch (1979).Daniel J. Frisch
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